Extra Cultural Warfare Update

[solarbird]

Normally, I don't do these on Saturday, but article one made me go, "woah," so I'm sending it out now. Then I hit article four, which was actually more disturbing. Article four is particularly interesting, because it's not policy; it's an approach to knowledge and argument. It attempts to redefine a "skeptic" as an "existentialist" (by defining skepticism as one would normally define existentialism), and providing a set of bulwarking arguments for what they call "particularism," which is to say, the assertion of ideas as truths without backing, justification, or knowledge. Also, in a paragraph not quoted (but at the URL), they attempt to prime against a useful argument against fundamentalist dictate thought, by providing an easy (and, IMO, inadequate) out. It's interesting that they're providing it. Many people must be using the argument involved.

Article one is still very interesting, though for more practical reasons.

Theoconservatives argue that you do _not have the right_ to refuse life support, feeding tubes, etc., even in the form of a living will - Andrew Sullivan commentary and quoting;

Larger text and direct link to what Sullivan was quoting - an article that I saw on Friday but didn't read enough to understand its importance;

Illinois governor signs emergency rule requiring pharmacies to fill all valid prescriptions after a Chicago pharmacist refuses to dispense birth control pills - if a pharmacist refuses to do so, another pharmacist at the same store must be available _immediately_ to do so - order is valid for 150 days while a permanent rule can be written;

Boundless runs an article indicating that fundamentalists may be trying to redefine - at least within their own community - the word "skeptic" to mean "existentialist" (by doing so), and provide an argument bulwark for defending positions fundamentalists hold that they cannot explain or justify;

Focus on the Family article on the evils of divorce.

----- 1 -----
Andrew Sullivan
http://www.andrewsullivan.com/
Friday, 1 April 2005

I MISSED THIS: My apologies but the Weekly Standard has already gone a long way toward answering my "What If?" question. In a subtle but ultimately very radical piece, Eric Cohen argues that the will of the vegetative person to be allowed to die, even if expressed in a living will or supported by all her family, is not the real issue here. People cannot be allowed to revoke life simply because it is theirs' to revoke:

[T]he real lesson of the Schiavo case is not that we all need living wills; it is that our dignity does not reside in our will alone, and that it is foolish to believe that the competent person I am now can establish, in advance, how I should be cared for if I become incapacitated and incompetent. The real lesson is that we are not mere creatures of the will: We still possess dignity and rights even when our capacity to make free choices is gone; and we do not possess the right to demand that others treat us as less worthy of care than we really are ... [T]he autonomy regime, even at its best, is deeply inadequate. It is based on a failure to recognize that the human condition involves both giving and needing care, and not always being morally free to decide our own fate.
(From http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/408ytxle.asp )

So if we reject the "autonomy regime," what replaces it? The moral obligation to keep even people in PVS in permanent medical care, regardless of her own wishes or that of the family. But Cohen is somewhat vague on how this new regime can be imposed. The only possibility, it seems to me, is that the law state emphatically that living wills are not dispositive, that family wishes are not relevant, and that the law set a series of medical or moral criteria to determine whether to keep someone alive indefinitely. Doctors and families would be obliged to obey such laws. The state would be obliged to enforce them - through the police power if necessary. What if the family could not afford the care? Presumably the state would be required to provide it. So let us be plain: the theoconservative vision would remove the right of individuals to decide their own fate in such cases, and would exclude the family from such a decision as well. Indeed, the law might even compel the family to provide care as long as they were capable of doing so. My "what if?" is a real one. And the theocon right has answered it. They want an end to the "autonomy regime." They have gone from saying that a pregnant mother has no autonomy over her own body because another human being is involved to saying that a person has no ultimate autonomy over her own body at all. These are the stakes. The very foundation of modern freedom - autonomy over one's own physical body - is now under attack. And if a theocon government won't allow you control over your own body, what else do you have left?


----- 2 -----
How Liberalism Failed Terri Schiavo
From the April 4, 2005 issue: The question is not only what she would have wanted, but what we owe her.
by Eric Cohen
04/04/2005, Volume 010, Issue 27

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/408ytxle.asp

THE STORY OF TERRI SCHIAVO is both peculiar in its details and paradigmatic in its meaning. The legal twists, political turns, and central characters are so odd that one hesitates to draw any broader conclusions. But the Schiavo case is also a tragic example of the moral and legal confusions that govern how we care for those who cannot speak for themselves, especially those whose lives might seem less than fully human. And so we have a responsibility to confront what has happened and why--especially if we are to understand our moral obligation as caregivers for incapacitated persons, and our civic obligation to protect those who lack the capacity to express their will but are still human, still living, and still deserving of equal protection under the law.

In February 1990, a sudden loss of oxygen to the brain left Theresa Marie Schiavo in a coma and eventually in a profoundly incapacitated state. Terri's husband, Michael Schiavo, took care of her, working alongside Terri's parents. He took her to numerous doctors; he pursued experimental treatments; he sought at least some modest restoration of her self-awareness. In November 1992, he testified at a malpractice hearing that he would care for Terri for the rest of her life, that he "wouldn't trade her for the world," that he was going to nursing school to become a better caregiver. He explicitly reaffirmed his marriage vow, "through sickness, in health."

But the lonely husband eventually began seeing other women. His frustration with his wife's lack of improvement

seemed to grow. When Terri suffered a urinary tract infection in the summer of 1993, he decided to cease all treatment, believing that her time to die had come, that this was what Terri would have wanted. But Terri's caregivers refused to let her die, and Michael Schiavo relented--for the time being. Not all Terri's doctors, however, saw their medical obligation in the same way; one physician declared that Terri had basically been dead for years, and told Michael that he should remove her feeding tube. Michael responded that he "couldn't do that to Terri," that he could never leave his wife to die of dehydration. But at some point, his heart changed. He decided that it was time for her final exit and his new beginning. He decided that his own wishes--for children, for a new family, for new love unclouded by old obligations--were also her wishes. He decided that she had a right to die and that he had a right to let her die.

Terri's parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, objected. They claimed that their son-in-law was no longer a fit guardian; that he was motivated by the money he would inherit at Terri's death; that Terri could improve with more love and better care. And so a long legal drama ensued, making its way through the Florida court system, centered on two sets of questions: First, what would Terri Schiavo have wanted? Would she want to die rather than live in a profoundly incapacitated condition? Was Michael Schiavo's decision to remove her feeding tube an act of fidelity to his wife's prior wishes or an act of betrayal of the woman entrusted to his care? Second, what was Terri Schiavo's precise medical condition? Did she have any hope of recovery or improvement? If her condition was unalterable--the persistence of sleeping and waking, the inscrutable moans, the uncontrolled movement of her bladder, the apparent absence of any self-awareness--was her life still meaningful?

[More at URL]


----- 3 -----
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/B/BIRTH_CONTROL_GOVERNOR?SITE=APWEB&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT
Ill. Governor Orders Prescriptions Filled

By MAURA KELLY LANNAN
Associated Press Writer

CHICAGO (AP) -- Gov. Rod Blagojevich approved an emergency rule Friday requiring pharmacies to fill birth control prescriptions quickly after a Chicago pharmacist refused to fill an order because of moral opposition to the drug.

The emergency rule takes effect immediately for 150 days while the administration seeks a permanent rule.

"Our regulation says that if a woman goes to a pharmacy with a prescription for birth control, the pharmacy or the pharmacist is not allowed to discriminate or to choose who he sells it to," Blagojevich said. "No delays. No hassles. No lectures."

Under the new rule, if a pharmacist does not fill the prescription because of a moral objection, another pharmacist must be available to fill it without delay.

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation has also filed a formal complaint against the Chicago Osco pharmacy for the Feb. 23 incident.


----- 4 -----
Answering the Skeptic
by J. P. Moreland
Boundless Magazine
(Published by Focus on the Family)

http://www.boundless.org/2005/articles/a0001061.cfm

In spite of the shortcomings of the hit movie, The Matrix, the first film in the trilogy raised important questions about human knowledge.

If Neo could never be sure that he wasn’t in the Matrix, how can you and I be sure that we’re not in the Matrix?

For example, how did Neo know when he was in the Matrix and when he was in the real world? If his experiences before taking the red pill were produced by the Matrix, how could he be sure his experiences after taking the red pill weren’t also produced by the Matrix? In other words, how could Neo be certain he ever left the Matrix? How could he be certain that his experience of leaving the Matrix wasn’t itself produced by the Matrix?

Much more importantly, if Neo could never be sure that he wasn’t in the Matrix, how can you and I be sure that we’re not in the Matrix? And if we can’t be sure — if we can’t offer an airtight argument for the conclusion that we’re not — how can we claim to know anything?

Let’s call this line of questioning “skepticism.” In this article, I’ll critique skepticism by showing that it makes indefensible assumptions about knowledge.

The Problem of the Criterion
We can distinguish two different questions relevant to the human quest for knowledge.

(1) Which of my beliefs count as knowledge?

and

(2) What are the criteria for knowledge?

Question (1) asks about the specific items of knowledge you possess; answering it gives you a picture of the extent and limits of your knowledge. Question (2) asks about the specific circumstances in which a belief would count as knowledge — it asks what all instances of knowledge have in common with each other.

Now suppose you want to appraise the intellectual respectability of your worldview and, in order to do so, decide to sort all of the beliefs that compose it into two groups: those that count as knowledge and those that do not. How should you proceed? Can you sort your beliefs with any accuracy if you don’t know what the criteria for knowledge are? If not, then it seems that you should start by answering question (2). But the only way to answer question (2) is to look at instances of knowledge and see, first, what they all have in common and, second, how they differ from beliefs that don’t count as knowledge. But you can only do this if you’ve already answered question (1).

So you can’t answer question (1) if you don’t first have an answer to question (2), and you can’t answer question (2) if you don’t first have an answer to question (1). And if you can’t answer either (1) or (2), then how can you know anything at all? This predicament is what philosophers call the problem of the criterion.1

Skepticism, Methodism and Particularism
There are three main responses to the problem of the criterion. First, there is “skepticism.” The skeptic claims that no good solution to the problem exists and that we therefore can’t know anything. Second, there is “methodism” (no connection to the denomination). According to the methodist, we can know things, and the solution to the problem starts with an answer to question (2). Moreover, methodists claim that a belief can only count as knowledge if you first know (a) what the criteria for knowledge are and (b) that the belief in question meets these criteria.

Unfortunately, methodism leads to serious problems. If knowledge of any belief requires prior knowledge of (a) and (b) — as methodism claims that it does — then the skeptic can ask the methodist how he knows (a) and (b). And since (a) and (b) are themselves beliefs, answering the skeptic will require the methodist to make further knowledge claims. But defending these knowledge claims will require him to make even further knowledge claims, and these will need defense as well, which will require yet more knowledge claims ... and so on and so forth to infinity.2 It would seem, then, that methodism is in trouble.

The third response to the problem of the criterion is called “particularism.” According to particularists, you know many things without being able to prove that you do and without understanding how you know them. Thus you can answer question (1) without having to possess or apply any criteria for knowledge — i.e. without first answering question (2). Moreover, reflecting on your answers to question (1) will allow you to develop criteria for knowledge consistent with them. This criteria can then be used to make judgments in borderline cases of knowledge.3 But note that these criteria are justified by their congruence with specific instances of knowledge rather than the other way around, as in methodism.

Of course, the skeptic objects to particularism as well. First, he’ll claim that particularism begs the question4 by simply assuming the very thing in need of proof — that some of our beliefs count as knowledge. Second, he’ll try to force the particularist into methodism — and all of its problems — by asking him such questions as “How do you know you’ve picked out the right beliefs as instances of knowledge? Isn’t it possible that you’re wrong? And if it’s possible that you’re wrong, shouldn’t you have to prove that you’re not?”

Rebutting the Skeptic
Fortunately, particularism offers a good response to both of these objections. Regarding the charge that particularism begs the question, the skeptic claims the particularist must prove that some of our beliefs count as knowledge. But if the skeptic doesn’t offer any reason for thinking this, his skepticism can be dismissed as arbitrary, rooted in personal preference rather than a substantive position or argument. If, on the other hand, his skepticism is the result of an argument, this argument must be reasonable to be taken seriously. But how can an argument be reasonable unless its premises count as knowledge?5 And if its premises do count as knowledge, then it can’t reasonably conclude that none of our beliefs count as knowledge. Unbridled skepticism is not a rationally defensible position; it cannot be rationally asserted and defended without presupposing that some of our beliefs count as knowledge.

[More at the URL]


----- 5 -----
The Way It Wasn't Supposed to Be
by Lynda Hunter
Focus on the Family

http://family.org/fofmag/marriage//a0010571.cfm

Birds chirped outside the window in the branches of the flowering locust tree. Spring hung in the air but not in my heart. I sat in the second row of the classroom watching my oldest daughter, 5-year-old Ashley, file into the room with the other students dressed for their preschool graduation.

The ceremony began. I scarcely heard a word, however, as I watched my child and wondered how the events of the previous 18 months would affect her. Her dad had left our home when Ashley was 3, her sister, Courtney, was 1 and I was pregnant with her brother, Clint. My mind retraced the events. Afraid to face what lay ahead on my own, I had surrendered my life to Christ. I prayed, "I give You not just this situation, but I give You my whole life."

Then I had read everything I could get my hands on and pulled godly people around me for counsel. In Love Life for Every Married Couple, author Ed Wheat talked about three options every couple face during crises in marriage: get divorced, remain in a bad situation or stay together and make things better. I had chosen to stay, but eventually my husband served me divorce papers.

[...]

If I could accomplish one thing with my life, it would be to stamp out divorce. I have seen the devastation it causes. I know why God says in Malachi 2:16, "I hate divorce." He knows and I know that divorce is not the way it was meant to be—not for the mother or the father or the children.

[More at URL]

Comments

[darkphoenixrisn.livejournal.com]

Illinois governor signs emergency rule requiring pharmacies to fill all valid prescriptions after a Chicago pharmacist refuses to dispense birth control pills - if a pharmacist refuses to do so, another pharmacist at the same store must be available _immediately_ to do so - order is valid for 150 days while a permanent rule can be written;

Good! If a pharmacist doesn't want to fill valid prescriptions, he or she should find a new line of work.

[avram]

“The autonomy regime”?

Didn’t we used to call that “freedom”?

[risu.livejournal.com]

*reads 4*

. . .

Fuck.

[solarbird]

Yes. They don't like it. I mean, they say they do, but they kinda don't. Certainly not when it's something they make into a "moral" issue.

[solarbird]

I know. It's self-programming within the culture. It's really kinda creepy.

[kitchengrrl.livejournal.com]

hmmm... the "skeptic's" argument that knowledge requires proof is just personal preference, but the "particularist's" argument that it doesn't is just unalterably right. OKAY. O_O